In the Great War, Patrick spent long enough at the front line (just over two years in three separate spells, from August 1914 to May 1918) to have formed definite opinions about which branch of the army should be avoided to maximise chances of survival. When he was conscripted back in to the Army in 1916, he expressed a wish to join the artillery. (See ‘Serving again’) His logic was sound. The composition of the Army changed significantly through the course of the war. The dangers inherent in serving in an infantry regiment did not change.
| 1914 | 1918 | Casualties | |
| Infantry | 53.9% | 32.8% | 83.4% |
| Artillery | 16.4% | 17.8% | 8.1% |
| Royal Engineers | 4.9% | 7.9% | 2.6% |
| Machine Gun Corps | 0% | 3.8% | 2.5% |
| Cavalry | 7.7% | 1% | 0.9% |
| Tank Corps | 0% | 1% | 0.3% |
| All others | 16.6% | 34.2% | 2.2% |
No matter what interpretation is placed on the data, it is clear that any branch of the Army is better than the infantry if one has hopes of a long life. It is not necessary to employ complex statistical analysis to realise that an infantryman is four or five times more likely to be killed or wounded than in any other area.
I can well imagine that Patrick would have advised his sons to volunteer for another branch of the services to preclude the possibility to being conscripted into an infantry regiment. But did his logic hold good in the Second World War?
The short answer is ‘yes’.
In his book ‘Overlord’ (which covers the invasion of mainland Europe in June 1944), Max Hastings has a wealth of data. “It had become brutally apparent to every man in (the American) First Army that service in an infantry unit was an almost certain sentence to death or wounds.” He goes on to say, “The unfortunate 90th Division suffered replacement of 150% of its officers and over 100% of enlisted men in its first six weeks of action.” (after D Day)
In June and July 1944, US casualties were 100,000. Of these, 85% were from the infantry. The planners had expected 70.3%, which is a remarkably precise figure!
The tank battalions also suffered heavily. The 712th Battalion lost 21 out of 74 tanks in 16 days in June 1944 and 21 out of 68 the following month. This represents a combined 30% loss rate. Other units fared worst. The 747th Battalion lost 41 tanks out of 61 in just 10 days of combat (67%) The 746th Battalion lost 44 out of 51 in 23 days (86% loss rate). These high figures are largely due to the relative technical superiority of the equipment fielded by the enemy. And there is nothing that the crews can do about that when the shooting starts!
The British Army attempted to forecast casualties using the Evett’s Rates. (Named after the work of a committee chaired by Major General Evett) The system took data from the Great War. It used three categories of action: intense, normal and quiet. Analysis revealed the need for another category: double intense. Much of the fighting in Normandy in June and July 1944 would be classified as ‘double intense’. The troops were in very close contact with the enemy.
The data is still stark. The highest casualty rates were experienced by the infantry. As much as 38% per month. The next highest figures come from parachutists and glider pilots with 26%. In both cases, the rates drop below 1% in quiet areas. It must be remembered that periods of intense (or double intense) action were relatively short for many units. Two successive months with 30% casualties will, without reinforcements, halve a unit’s strength.
Patrick’s advice to avoid the Army appears to have been sound. Were the alternatives any better?